












In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content.

1. Introduction
Most philosophers of science have avoided making reference to the no​tion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epis​temic states of the individuals in​volved compro​mises the objectivity of explana​tion. Understanding is a prag​matic no​tion, they argue, and although a subject wor​thy of curi​osity, prag​matics should be kept at a safe distance from the uni​versal features of expla​nation. My main co​ntention in this paper is that there is a sense in which it is mean​ingful and useful to talk about objec​tive understanding, and that to char​ac​terize this notion it is necessary to formulate an ac​count of ob​jective expla​na​tion that makes refer​ence to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the partici​pants in a cog​ni​tive en​terprise.

2. Three Theses about Explanation
It has often been said that explanation is an interest-relative notion. Different inquiring agents impose different demands on the information they regard as ex​planatorily valuable. The interest-relativity of explanation has been accounted for in several ways: some authors have proposed a contrastive analysis of the explanandum (Garfinkel, 1981; van Fraassen, 1980; Lipton, 1991), or a detailed description of the illocutionary context of an explana​tory speech act (Achinstein, 1983).
	In my view, the interest-relativity of explanation has a much deeper origin. It de​rives from the interest-relativity of inquiry in general. Different agents use in​formation for different purposes, and their acceptance of new infor​mation is directed by their cognitive interests and goals. Far from being a superfi​cial characteristic of inquiry, I believe that this is a fundamental trait of the acquisition of knowledge in general. The cost and effort that goes into obtaining new information makes the beliefs that an inquiring agent has accepted a valuable asset that must be treated with care. Gratuitous losses must be prevented, and the agent’s ac​ceptance of new information al​ways involves the risk of bring​ing error into his system of beliefs. The risk must always be com​pen​sated by an epis​temic in​cen​tive that out​weighs the cost.
	One of the biggest epistemic in​cen​tives of all is to obtain understand​ing of a phenomenon. But if understanding a given phenomenon fulfills no pur​pose in the eyes of an inquiring agent, he will be more reluctant to incur the risks in​volved in accepting an explanation of it. On the other hand, if understanding a phenomenon fulfills the cognitive interests and goals of the agent, but the information explains too much, it might be too good to be true. The acceptance of an explanation thus requires a delicate balance between two con​flicting cognitive goals: the acquisition of valuable explanatory information and the avoid​ance of error.
The account of explanation that I present in this paper takes into account the difference between information and informational value. When an agent seeks to expand his beliefs, his inter​est is re​stricted to infor​mation that promotes his cognitive goals or that is relevant to the problems he is trying to solve. In Catherine Elgin’s words, “truth does not always enhance understanding. An irrele​vant truth is epistemically inert” (1996, 124). I will ar​gue that the goal of an inquir​ing agent is not just to find expla​nations; it is to find epis​temi​cally valuable explanations. This idea is captured by the following three theses:

1. 	Whether a piece of information is a potential explanation of the fact that P is mostly a non​prag​matic matter.

2. 	It is possible to determine the objective epistemic value of a subset of all the potential explanations of the fact that P.

3.	In trying to understand the fact that P, an inquiring agent should only accept the poten​tial ex​plana​tions with positive objective epistemic value.

In the next section, I will state in a somewhat dogmatic fashion the conditions that information must fulfill to be a potential explanation. A complete discussion of these conditions can be found in Páez (2006). My main purpose in this paper is to defend the second and third theses, and the fulfillment of that purpose is not dependant on whether these conditions are fully adequate.

3. Potential Explanations
The account of explanation that I will present is based on the belief-doubt model of inquiry defended by Peirce, Dewey, Levi, and others. Ac​cording to the belief-doubt model, an inquiring agent presupposes that eve​rything he is cur​rently committed to fully believing is true. This does not mean that truth or falsity is relative to what the agent believes. But the agent’s judgments of what is true and what is false are relative to what he currently believes. If the agent is con​cerned with the acquisition of new error-free infor​mation, his assessment of the risk of error incurred and of the epistemic value obtained in accepting a piece of informa​tion can only be made relative to the judgments of truth available to him.
An inquiring agent has no doubt that all the sentences in his corpus of be​liefs K are true. Nonetheless, he does not regard all of the facts stated by these sentences as being equally well-under​stood. The degree to which an agent under​stands the fact expressed by a sentence P will depend on how well-integrated P is to the agent’s cognitive system. It will not depend on how much support it has or on how epistemi​cally entrenched it is. On the one hand, if a sentence has been ac​cepted in K, it is judged to be true and no fur​ther argument is necessary.​[2]​ On the other hand, poorly understood phe​nom​ena can be highly epistemically entrenched, and completely useless facts can be very well-un​derstood. 
Logic alone is clearly not sufficient to describe an inquiring agent’s system of commitments. Many of our most important beliefs about the world are stated in terms of probabilities, and these beliefs must be included in as​sessing the degree to which an agent understands a given fact. The probability sentences in K will ex​press the agent’s com​mitment to objective relevance relations be​tween facts. 
Roughly speaking, understanding a phenomenon is a matter of knowing how it fits into the agent’s system of doxas​tic commit​ments. In order to understand the fact that P, the agent must add to her state of belief sentences that capture the idea that there are facts that contribute to make P true, and fac​ts that act against it. Without such information, P will describe a brute fact, iso​lated from the rest of the agent’s beliefs about the world. Probability sentences are the con​necting tissue of an agent’s corpus of be​liefs about the world. They make evident which facts lowered P’s chance of not being true, and which facts raised its chance of being false. The type of probability sen​tences that we are interested in are not of the form p(P /Q) = r. This type of sen​tence will not tell the agent what influence Q has on P. Would r be higher if Q were not true? Would the absence of Q make any difference at all? Indeed, specific probability values have de​scriptive, predictive, and evidential value, but no ex​planatory value. The prob​ability sentences that the agent should look for will have the form p(P /Q)  p(P/~Q) and p(P /Q)  p(P /~Q).  These are the sen​tences that allow the agent to determine the factors that posi​tively or negatively affect P’s ob​jective chances of being true.
 	Let K be the set of beliefs that represents the shared agreement between the members of a community of ex​perts, and let P be a sentence in K.  A set of sentences E is a potential explanation of the fact stated by P rela​tive to K just in case: 

(i)	K  E is consistent.
(ii)	E  K 
(iii) 	There is a sentence Q such that Q  E.
(iv) 	Either p(P /Q)  p(P /~Q)  E  or  p(P /Q)  p(P /~Q)  E.
(v) 	There is no R  K such that p(P /Q & R) = p(P /~Q & R).
(vi)	P and Q are logically independent.
(vii)	Nothing else is an element of E.

The first condition states that a potential ex​pla​nation must be consistent with the corpus of be​liefs in which the explanandum is accepted. The second condition states that the potential explanation cannot be already accepted in K. The third condition says that the potential explanation must include a singular sentence Q that describes a potentially relevant factor. The fourth condi​tion states that Q is positively or negatively relevant to the fact that P. The fifth condi​tion guarantees that P and Q will not be spu​riously corre​lated, as far as we know. Condition (vi) guarantees that P will not explain it​self. It also pre​vents the inclusion of trivial cases in which p(P /Q) = 1 because P├ Q. The last condition ensures that each potential explanation contains only one relevant factor and one probability sentence. Bona fide explanations will typically mention several relevant factors. A potential explanation is thus a set containing a singular sentence that describes a fact, and a prob​abil​ity sentence that states the potential statistical relevance of that fact to the explanandum.
Using our definition of a potential explanation, we can now characterize the notion of an explanation space. An explanation space can be understood as the set of sentences that contains all the potential ex​pla​na​tions of P, regardless of whether the inquirers are aware of them or not.
 
(P)	For every sentence P in K, there is a set {E1, E2, …, En} such that Ei is an element of the set if and only if it is a potential explanation of P. The set, de​noted P, is the explanation space of P.
	
	The explanation space will typically contain logically equivalent and empirically equiv​alent potential explanations. On the one hand, if the explanatory facts described by Q and R are logically equiva​lent, the potential explanations in which they appear will be logically equivalent.  On the other hand, if Q and R contain coextensive singu​lar terms or predicates that occupy the same places in Q and R, the potential explanations in which they appear will be empirically equiv​alent potential explana​tions. However, the explanatory value and the credibil​ity of the two explanations will not be assessed in the same way unless the agents who assess them are aware that the sin​gular terms or predicates are coextensive.


4. The Objective Epistemic Value of Explanation
According to the belief-doubt model, an inquiring agent’s judgments of truth are always rela​tive to what he is cur​rently committed to fully believing. Thus, an agent’s decision to accept an explanation can only be made relative to the judg​ments of truth available to him. Naturally such decisions will lack any sort of objectivity. An agent who wants to claim objectivity for the explanations that he accepts must first make sure that the explanation is consistent with K, the set of beliefs that represents the shared agreement between the members of a learning community. But that is not enough. The objectivity of our conjectures lies, as Pop​per correctly points out, “in the fact that they can be intersubjectively tested” (1959, 44). The intersubjective test that an explanation must pass is the evalua​tion of its credibility and of its explanatory value in the eyes of the experts.  
Suppose a group of inquir​ers—a community of experts in the field—wants to con​sider the adoption of an explanation. To do so, they must first adopt a belief state K rep​resenting the shared agreement be​tween them. Such a belief state is available to them because the states of belief in a concep​tual framework are par​tially or​dered in a manner satisfying the require​ments of a Boolean algebra (Levi, 1991). In con​sequence, it will be possible to form the meet of their individual states, i.e., the strongest common con​sequence of all their states of belief. Obviously, such a state will contain more than just singular sentences representing facts and probability sentences. It will also include sentences that state which are the most relevant problems in the field, what type of ex​peri​ments and ob​serva​tions are considered more reliable, in addition to basic methodo​logical and reasoning princi​ples.​[3]​
Once the members of the community of experts have accepted a common corpus, they must take K as the basis for establishing a set of potential explana​tions of the prob​lem at hand, For ex​ample, suppose a group of inquirers are trying to estab​lish why P. They must initially agree on a set of ground facts and low level hypotheses. Statistical data and the chronology of the explanandum will be easy to agree upon. The explanation of some aspects of the phenomenon can be noncontrover​sially accepted, while the ex​planation of others will be a matter of heated debate. After the inquirers have agreed on a com​mon corpus of beliefs K, they can put together a set of explana​tory options, denoted P, which will include all the factors consistent with K that might ex​plain P and that have been identified by the inquirers. At this stage of inquiry it does not matter whether the potential expla​nations are uncontroversial or completely outlandish, as long as they are somehow relevant to the problem at hand and consistent with K.
It is possible for a group of agents to share the same information and yet disagree about the degree of belief or credal probability that they assign to the information in the set of ex​planatory options. Since the agents do not want to beg the question by assign​ing the high​est marks to their favorite explanations, they must adopt a common credal probability measure. A common strategy to eliminate the conflict between dif​ferent credal probability distributions is to represent the shared agree​ment as the weighted average of the distribu​tions in conflict. The resulting credal probabil​ity function C determines the objec​tive risk of error in​curred in accepting a potential explanation in P. Let Ei be the conjunction of the elements of a potential explanation Ei in P, i.e., the conjunction of a singular sentence and a probabil​ity sentence. For every po​tential explanation Ei, the risk of error is  1  C(Ei).
	On the other hand, different inquirers will disagree in their assessment of the im​portance of the explanations contained in the set of explanatory options. Despite these differ​ences, there must be a minimal objective criterion to measure the explanatory value of any potential explanation. That criterion is the new informa​tion carried by the po​tential explanation, which, following Levi, I identify with its logical strength. The set of potential expan​sions of K can be partially ordered by a clas​sical conse​quence relation. The set is a Boolean algebra in which the minimum is K and the maximum is the inconsistent state. If a probability function M is defined over this set, and if the only element that has probability zero is the inconsistent state, potential expan​sions of K will strictly in​crease in prob​abil​ity with a decrease in logical strength. When the M-function is defined over the set of poten​tial explanations of interest to the inquirer, we obtain a measure of the informa​tional content of the potential explanations in P. The measure of the informa​tional content of a potential explanation Ei, denoted Cont(Ei), is 1  M(Ei).
	The informational content of a potential explanation is the first objective criterion that should be used in assessing the explanatory value of the elements of P. The evaluation of their explanatory value is subject to the following weak monotonicity requirement (WMR):

(WMR)	If a potential explanation E1 in P carries at least as much informa​tion as another potential explanation E2 in P, E1 carries at least as much ex​planatory value as E2.

Not all potential explanations of the fact that P are compa​ra​ble in terms of logical content. It is possible, for example, that three potential explana​tions E1, E2, and E3 are con​sistent with K, but logically independent from each other and from the other po​tential explanations in the set of explanatory options. Since the community of experts wants to consider all the explanations avail​able to them, they might invoke further criteria in order to complete the quasi-ordering imposed by the weak monotonicity requirement. In order to assess the explanatory value of the remaining elements of P, they can evaluate if they have certain properties that are considered explanatorily virtuous. There are several candidates for that title in the philosophical litera​ture. Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989), for example, argue that explana​tions im​prove our understanding of the world through the unification of our knowledge. Mellor (1995) says that the explanatory virtue of a causal explanation depends on how much the cause raises the chance of its effect. Whewell (1837) suggested that one hypothesis has more ex​planatory value than another if the former explains more of the evidence than the latter. 
A full analysis of these explanatory virtues is beyond the aim of this paper, and it is also unneces​sary. If the criteria are such that the com​munity of experts can agree on their impor​tance and on how they should be applied in par​ticu​lar cases, they can be added to the belief state K that represents their shared agree​ment. The agents will then be able to complete, to some degree, the quasi-ordering gener​ated by the monotonicity condition with respect to the M-function. But to ex​pect a complete agreement in the way that all the agents engaged in common in​quiry assess the ex​planatory value of different potential ex​planation is to expect a hetero​geneous group of inquirers to agree on what aspects of re​ality they find in​teresting or useful. As John Ear​man correctly points out, all that is needed to guarantee the objec​tivity of in​quiry is that “the community of experts share a para​digm in the weak sense of agreement on the ex​planatory domain of the field, on the circumscription of the space of possible theories to be considered seri​ous can​didates for covering the explanatory domain, on exemplars of ex​planatory success, and on key auxiliary hy​potheses” (1993, 31).
If a common decision is required nonetheless, the community of experts can adopt the fol​lowing compromise. The agents must first identify the elements of the set P that can be completely ordered because they are comparable in terms of strength or because they can be compared using the criteria to evaluate explanatory value that they have incorporated to K. The agents can then agree to disagree about the explanatory value of the remaining ele​ments of P. Let *P be a set of explanatory options such that *P  P and such that the M-value of each element of the set is determined. Combining the credal probability func​tion C with the M-function defined over the elements of *P , we obtain a value that the community of experts can use to select the best ex​planation of P. Following Levi (1991), I will call this result the objective epistemic value of a potential explanation: 

(OEV)	V(Ei) = C(Ei) + (1  Cont(Ei)

If we assume that q = (1  )/, we obtain the following positive affine transfor​ma​tion of OEV:

V(Ei) = C(Ei)  qM(Ei)

where q is the index of boldness. The agents’ interest in valuable information should not outweigh the desideratum to avoid error; thus   0.5. And since the information they seek should not be worthless, 1 > . In consequence, 0  q  1. Since a determinate degree of bold​ness must be established for the group to be able to make decisions, the in​dex of boldness should be the average of their individual indices. 
Once this is settled, the ex​perts should reject a potential explana​tion in *P if V(Ei) is negative, remain un​committed if it is 0, and accept it if it is positive. Any potential expla​nation in *P with positive objective epistemic value is an objective expla​nation of P in K. The disjunction of all such objective expla​nations is the ob​jective explana​tion of P in K:

(OEP) 	The objective explanation of P in K is the disjunction of all the potential explanations in *P with positive objec​tive epistemic value.

	Something must be said about the agent’s decision to give up some of his be​liefs in order to accept the ver​dict of the community of experts. Suppose an agent has accepted an explanation of P based on his individual assessment of its credibility and its explanatory value. Now suppose that he submits his subjective ex​planation to the com​mu​nity of ex​perts, and the explanation is judged to be maxi​mally credible and maxi​mally valu​able by the community, thus becoming an objective explanation. Does the agent understand more now that his explanation has been certified by others? It seems to me that he does not. But if the agent does not obtain more understanding from this rec​ognition, why should anyone seek objectiv​ity for an explanation that he or she al​ready believes?
	Part of the answer is that the belief-doubt model is not a recipe for dogma​tism. A seldom noted fact about inquiry is that most newly suggested explanatory hy​poth​eses do not survive the test of intersubjective scrutiny. If the agent is aware of this fact—and he should be if he is a responsible inquirer—it would be imprudent for him to give his full as​sent to an explanatory hypothesis that con​tra​dicts firmly established theories and findings without obtaining at least a partial intersubjec​tive assessment of its merit. An agent does not need to fully believe that an explanation is true to obtain the understanding that the explanation provides. Any inquirer can explore the consequences of a hypothesis by assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is true. If the hypothesis is judged to have positive objec​tive epistemic value by a com​munity of experts, the inquirer will then be fully justified in giving it his full assent.
 	But the question remains. If the agent does not obtain new understanding in the approval that he receives from his peers, why should he seek their approval? What pre​vents an agent from individually assessing the explanatory value of a potential explanation, and deciding to fully believe it if his individual understanding is thereby increased? In other words, why should ob​jectivity matter?
	The answer is that objectivity itself is a property of information that some agents find valuable and some do not. An agent who decides to be a member of a learn​ing com​munity does so because he believes that his beliefs will be more valu​able if they are ob​jective. Other agents will find that objectivity adds no value to their corpus of beliefs. Just as there is a dif​ference between objective and sub​jective explanation, there is an analo​gous dis​tinction between objective and sub​jective un​derstanding. The latter is the type of understanding that Hempel (1965) cor​rectly believed should be shunned at all costs from an ac​count of scientific explanation. But the reason it should be shunned is not that it is an in​ferior type of understand​ing. The reason is that the members of a scientific community are among the many agents who find objectivity valuable. Therefore, an account of scientific explana​tion should avoid any reference to an evaluative process in which the agent shows no concern for the views of others. 
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^1	  This paper was presented at the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.
^2	  It is possible, of course, to understand a state of affairs that one does not fully believe. In such cases the agent supposes, for the sake of argument, that the sentence describing the state of affairs is true, and adjusts his beliefs accordingly. For a discussion of suppositional reasoning, see Levi (1996).
^3	  These are some of the elements that Kitcher (1993, chapter 3) identifies as the basis for a consensus practice. Kitcher offers a meticulous model of the dynamics of scientific debate in which individual sci​entists driven by impure and non-cognitive motives manage nonetheless to form groups that develop in epis​temically pro​gressive ways. His approach uses a naturalistic background to formulate a prescriptive theory of scientific progress. My approach to consensus forming, on the other hand, is drawn along purely decision theoretical lines, and it is not limited to the case of science.
